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Abstract
To support ubiquitous computing, the underlying data have to be persistent and available anywhere-
anytime. The data thus have to migrate from devices that are local to individual computers, to shared stor-
age volumes that are accessible over open network. This potentially exposes the data to heightened security
risks. In particular, the activity on a database exhibits regular page reference patterns that could help
attackers learn logical links among physical pages and then launch additional attacks. We propose two
countermeasures to mitigate the risk of attacks initiated through analyzing the shared storage servers
activity for those page patterns. The ﬁrst countermeasure relocates data pages according to which page
sequences they are in. The second countermeasure enhances the ﬁrst by randomly prefetching pages from
predicted page sequences. We have implemented the two countermeasures in MySQL, and experiment
results demonstrate their eﬀectiveness and practicality.
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1. Introduction
Ubiquitous computing entails the permeation of computing in every facet of our lives, be it
work, personal or leisure, to a point where users take it for granted and stop to notice it. The data
that underlie the ubiquitous services have to be persistent and available anywhere-anytime. This
means that the data must migrate from devices that are local to individual computers, to shared
network storage, or even to outsourced storage systems that are hosted and managed by external
storage service providers. A development that would facilitate this migration is the shared storage
area network (SAN) that is accessible over TCP/IP network through iSCSI, a block-level access
protocol. Another supporting development is the recent interest in building reliable logical storage
volumes on unreliable nodes in a peer-to-peer platform (e.g. [1,2]). Having a storage backend that
is untrusted, or under a diﬀerent administrative domain, requires a re-examination of the security
architecture of the DBMS.
Currently, almost all mainstream database systems have access control sub-systems that allow
administrators to specify access policies for data objects. These access control mechanisms can be
extended or complemented by data encryption [3–5], so that it is practically impossible to recon-
struct data from illegal copies of the underlying physical ﬁles. To support various sensitivity levels
among the shared data, advanced systems can even encrypt data at table level or record level.
However, operating a DBMS on top of an untrusted storage server opens the possibility for an
attacker to by-pass the access control of the DBMS, by targeting the storage server instead. This
can be done on modern stackable ﬁle systems [6], by inserting a malicious ﬁlter driver in the ﬁle
system to intercept the page references issued by the DBMS. By analyzing the page references, the
attacker can then gather auxiliary information for additional attacks.
To illustrate, suppose a table is stored in an encrypted ﬁle, so the data content and organization
are protected. By observing the page retrievals from repeated scans of the table as in a nested loop
join, an attacker could deduce the logical structure of the table. With the knowledge of the logical
structure, the observer could then infer, from the current I/O patterns, what operations are being
executed on this table. For instance, a full table scan reads sequentially the whole table, while a
index based query travels the index of the table ﬁrst then reads parts of the table.
To protect data against such page reference analysis attacks, we need to mask the I/O activities
of protected databases such that no useful reference patterns can be observed at the storage server.
We present two countermeasures to achieve this objective—sequentiality-aware page relocation
(SAPR) and out-of-order prefetching (OOP). SAPR relocates data pages according to which page
sequences they are in, aiming to reduce the recurrence of page patterns. OOP enhances SAPR by
randomly prefetching pages from predicted page sequences to further perturb the sequentiality of
page sequences. We have implemented the two countermeasures in MySQL, and results from run-
ning typical daily transactions are analyzed from both security and performance angles. As far as
we know, this is the ﬁrst work that addresses the security threat of analyzing database page ref-
erence patterns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related work on
encryption storage and traﬃc analysis. Section 3 deﬁnes the threat from page reference analysis,
while Section 4 introduces our countermeasures against the threat. Following that, Section 5 pre-
sents a prototype implementation and reports experiment results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper and discusses directions for future work.
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2. Related work
2.1. Database reference patterns
In [7], Chou and DeWitt ﬁrst observed that the pattern of page references exhibited by database
operations in relational database systems are very regular and predictable. These reference pat-
terns fall into three categories: sequential, random and hierarchical.
• Sequential references: In a sequential scan, pages in a table are retrieved and processed one
after another. Operations like a selection on an unordered relation involve only one scan,
whereas other operations like nested loop join and merge join may scan (parts of) a table
repeatedly.
• Random references: These access patterns are commonly observed in retrieving the leaf nodes
of a non-clustered B+-tree index. Such a pattern could be repeated within the same operation,
for example during an index nested loop join.
• Hierarchical references: A hierarchical reference is a sequence of page accesses that form a tra-
versal path from the root down to the leaves of a tree index.
Based on the above classiﬁcation, the authors proposed a DBMIN algorithm that carries out
buﬀer allocation and replacement according to the reference pattern for each operation. Neverthe-
less, even where DBMIN is implemented, parts of the access patterns will appear at the server if
an operation is not given its full buﬀer allocation.
In addition, the data access sequence for a query is usually predictable after it is optimized. This
information on which data pages are likely to be accessed next is commonly exploited in database
buﬀer management and prefetching to improve performance [8,9]. In this paper, we exploit the
same predictive information to remove recurrent patterns in the servers I/O traﬃc.
2.2. Schemes for hiding traﬃc patterns
As traditional encrypted storage does not address the risk of I/O traﬃc analysis that shared net-
work storage must contend with, an attacker who is monitoring the storage can analyze the pat-
terns of the data traﬃc, and from there additional attacks could be conducted. This is the traﬃc
analysis problem [10].
Traﬃc analysis has been studied extensively in the context of anonymous communication.
Chaum ﬁrst introduced the mix-net in [11]. In a mix-net, messages are modiﬁed through some
cryptographic transformation and output randomly such that an observer cannot correlate which
output message corresponds to a given input message. This technique forms the basis for the more
recent work on Onion Routing [12]. In [13], Guan et al. championed the use of traﬃc rerouting
and padding to hide communication patterns. [14] further proposed to vary the amount of pad-
ding traﬃc to improve performance.
Other privacy protection schemes that are closely related to our work are oblivious RAM, pri-
vate information retrieval (PIR), and hiding tree-structured data. Oblivious RAM [15] is a cryp-
tographic processor that prevents memory access patterns from leaking any details about the
execution, but it requires many additional redundant access cycles and frequent memory shuﬄing
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and, therefore, leads to signiﬁcant performance degradation. PIR [16,17] protects user privacy by
hiding the identity of database items being retrieved by the user. However, the heavy communi-
cation cost or the need for database replications make the proposed PIR systems diﬃcult to be
deployed in practical database systems. In [18], two techniques were proposed to hide tree-struc-
tured data and traversal paths from an untrusted data store: (1) each time a genuine node is
accessed, a set of randomly selected m  1 nodes are accessed simultaneously; (2) each time a
genuine node is accessed, it will also be swapped with an empty node. The overhead of this scheme
is clearly m times more traﬃc, where m is usually large to satisfy security requirements. In this
paper, one of our proposed schemes—page relocation strategy—is similar to the node-swapping
technique. However, our solution is more general in that it hides not only tree traversals but all
other reference patterns as well, such as table scan.
In a recent paper [19], we ﬁrst proposed the mechanism of generating dummy accesses to pre-
vent attackers from locating hidden ﬁles through analyzing ﬁle I/O activities. The key diﬀerenti-
ation is that whereas the system context for [19] involves generic applications that issue
unpredictable accesses on ﬁles, the current work deals with databases that exhibit regular, predict-
able page reference patterns [7], as explained in the previous section, that an attacker can spot
much more easily.
3. Page reference analysis in DBMS
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne the system deployment model, and discuss the security threats
posed by attackers. To see how easily this threat can be realized, we also provide a sequence min-
ing algorithm that could identify page reference patterns from the disk activity log. Finally, we
propose a security measure to quantify the eﬀectiveness of the proposed schemes.
3.1. System model
Fig. 1 shows the system context for our work. As explained in Section 1, in order for the data
underlying an ubiquitous service to be persistent and available anywhere-anytime, the data have
Fig. 1. System model.
4
to reside on a storage volume that is accessible over an open IP network. A common practical
scenario for such a model is a shared storage area network (SAN) that is accessible over TCP/
IP networks through iSCSI, a block-level access protocol. The model is also consistent with un-
trusted data stores advocated in [18,20,21]. While the users and the database engine that performs
user authentication and access control can be (though not necessarily are) protected within in-
dividual trusted networks, the page storage is susceptible to attacks and could become compro-
mised. Thus, it is necessary to perform encryption/decryption in the DB engine, so that the
page storage sees only pages in encrypted form. To directly decrypt pages at arbitrary positions
within a ﬁle, seekable stream ciphers such as SEAL [22], or block ciphers running in counter mode
[23] may be used to encrypt the database tables. We employ SEAL in this work as stream ciphers
are known to provide much better performance than block ciphers. This choice is particularly use-
ful if the database server is resource-constrained, for instance, where we have a mobile database
engine running on a smart card.
In the above system model, there are several security issues: (1) privacy of data during trans-
mission; (2) privacy of static stored data; and 3) privacy of data during access. The ﬁrst issue, pri-
vacy during network transmission, has been studied widely in Internet security and addressed by
the Secure Socket Layer protocol (SSL) [24] and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [25].
The second issue, protecting static data from illegally copying, is addressed through data encryp-
tion and proper key management. In this paper, we focus on the third issue—security breaches
from the data traﬃc at the page storage. Admittedly, there are other attacks like traﬃc intercep-
tion, replay and denial of service, but they have been studied elsewhere and are beyond the scope
of this work.
3.2. Threat from page reference patterns
Existing encryption storage systems are primarily designed to ensure that an attacker cannot
easily decipher static encrypted data. They do not address the additional risk of traﬃc analysis
faced by shared untrusted network storage. With our system model, we must assume that in the
worst case an attacker is able to monitor all access activities on the page storage. In particular,
to observe the storage I/O activities, an attacker could take either of the following two methods:
(1) scan the storage volume repeatedly to look for changes in the raw content, which could be
done through remote access; (2) trap the I/O requests between the DB engine and the page ser-
ver, either by installing a malicious ﬁle system ﬁlter driver or by spreading viruses to intercept
system calls. Both ways could be achieved through inserting a ﬁlter driver in a stackable ﬁle sys-
tem [6], as shown in Fig. 2. Note that the stackable ﬁle system model is applicable to both Win-
dows and Unix ﬁle systems. The installed ﬁlter driver logs the page number and reference time
for further analysis, where the reference time refers to the time that the page is accessed. Fur-
thermore, the attacker may have complete understanding of the mechanisms running in the
system.
As explained above, recurring reference patterns in the disk access sequence provides hints on
repeated database operations, and thus the logical links among physical pages. One way for an
attacker to locate repeated patterns is to run a sequence mining algorithm on the disk activity
log. For this work, we developed two sequential mining algorithms (EPT and PPS) in [26], based
on the minimal occurrence method that counts the distinct occurrences of each detected pattern.
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Running over the page access sequence from the storage servers activity log, the algorithms ﬁnd
all sequential patterns, e.g. lists of sets of page references, with user-speciﬁed minimum number of
occurrences and constraints which might deﬁne the durations or structures of patterns. Through
ﬁne-tuning the constraints, we captured, on average, over half of the actual patterns in conducted
experiments. Having obtained those informational patterns, additional attacks could be con-
ducted. The following are some typical examples.
• Database operations present diﬀerent reference patterns. For example, as shown in Fig. 3a, a
continuous repeated reference pattern might hint at a loop join operation on a table; reference
patterns sharing a common preﬁx might suggest that those involved pages are part of an index.
Piecing together that information, a powerful attacker could infer some of the operations cur-
rently being executed in the database engine.
• Fig. 3b shows another example. Suppose that the attacker could get the information about the
user sessions of individual users (e.g. when they start and end)—for instance through social
engineering [27]. The attacker then is able to mine for access patterns associated to any target
User Process
Virtual File System
System Calls
Filter Driver 1
Filter Driver 2
.
.
.
Logical Volume
User Space
Kernel Space
Native File System
(Ext3,NTFS,FAT32,etc.)
D
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Fig. 2. Architecture of stackable ﬁle system.
Observed Sequence:
...2358.2358..2358.. 469..467..461
4
2  3
5  8
Table Index
6 7 1 9
a
19282742030...4648282734738266.. .... 376228627436583
192827420-48282734738-62286274365
Observed Sequence:
User A User A User A
b 
Fig. 3. Additional attack examples: (a) hint about physical structure and (b) mining reference patterns of particular
user.
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user. Speciﬁcally, he ﬁrst identiﬁes those intervals when the user is logged on to the DB engine,
then mines the combined sequences for repeated reference patterns. If a repetitive pattern
h28274i appears rarely outside of this users sessions, it would imply that the data in those pages
is critical to this particular user. This could prompt the attacker to attempt to decipher the
pages or, worse, coerce the user into disclosing the data.
• In addition, the frequencies of access patterns may also indicate which parts of the database are
more useful than others, so that the attacker may pay more attention to them.
To raise the diﬃculty of isolating reference patterns, we propose two countermeasures: (1) relo-
cating pages with the aim of reducing the support of patterns, and (2) prefetching random parts of
reference sequences with the aim of disturbing the sequentiality in reference sequences. We will
discuss them in detail later.
3.3. Security metrics
A countermeasure against traﬃc analysis is to reduce informational patterns. Our proposed
schemes achieve this by transforming the original reference sequences so that there will be few
or even no valuable patterns left in the transformed reference sequences. To evaluate the eﬀective-
ness of the transformations, two quantities are measured.
First, we mine the transformed reference sequence to examine whether any informational ref-
erence patterns could be found by an attacker. For this purpose, we use the concept of recall
from Information Retrieval. It is deﬁned as the number of patterns in the transformed sequence
over the number of patterns in the original sequence, where the patterns are obtained through
running the sequential mining tool that we reported in [26]. A better countermeasure should
expose fewer patterns, i.e., has a lower recall. The recall is, however, not an objective measure
as it depends on the diﬀerent constraints and minimum frequency speciﬁed in the mining
algorithms.
For a more objective measure, we calculate the correlation between the transformed sequence
and the original sequence. Ideally, the transformed sequence is always independent of the original
sequence, and no information will be leaked by monitoring the transformed sequence. The con-
cept of correlation here, however, cannot be obtained using the Pearsons correlation coeﬃcient
that measures only the linear dependence among numerical sequences. Instead, the mutual in-
formation function from Information Theory, which measures correlation by calculating the in-
formation shared between two symbolic sequences [28], is more appropriate here. The mutual
information vanishes if either (1) the sequences have no entropy or information to share, or (2)
the variables in the sequences are statistically independent. The ﬁrst case means that the sequence
is fully predictable. As an example, the page server reads the whole disk from start to end repeat-
edly; no matter serving which pages, the page server always reads pages in this ﬁxed sequence.
This example achieves independence between the sequences, at the price of high I/O overhead.
In general, transforming an irregular symbolic sequence to a fully predictable one would inevita-
bly incur the penalty of high I/O overhead. The second case requires that sequences be statistically
independent. Unfortunately, this is not easy to determine precisely given the large number of dif-
ferent symbols (disk pages). Considering that a truly random sequence is statistically independent
of any other sequence, an alternative way is to measure how random the transformed sequence is.
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Speciﬁcally, the more random the transformed sequences, the fewer patterns could be found. For
this purpose, we use the conditional entropy from information theory to quantify the randomness
of a sequence [29].
Deﬁnition 1 (Conditional entropy). The conditional entropy tells how much uncertainty remains
in a sequence of events E after we have seen subsequence s. The conditional probability of an
event e based on a context s is written as p(ejs). For an event set E, the conditional entropy of a
sequence is
HðEjCÞ ¼
X
s2C
pðsÞ
X
e2E
pðejsÞlog2
1
pðejsÞ ð1Þ
where C is the set of all possible contexts. The maximal length of subsequences in C is the order of
conditional entropy. According to the deﬁnition, the presence of patterns increases p(ejs), thus
decreasing the overall conditional entropy. In other words, the higher the entropy, the higher
the uncertainty contained within the sequence, which means less discernible patterns. For simplic-
ity, the entropy as mentioned in the rest of this paper refers to conditional entropy.
4. Counter measures for page reference analysis
Having highlighted the security threats from database page reference patterns, we now present
two countermeasures to protect an encrypted DBMS against such attacks. Since we expect an at-
tacker to look for repeated page patterns at the storage server, we aim to raise the diﬃculty of
isolating genuine reference patterns.
4.1. Sequentiality-aware page relocation
Conceptually, if data pages are relocated on every read or write access, there would be no re-
peated patterns in the server access activity. Moreover, if the attacker cannot track the location
changes, no pattern would be inferred from the reference sequences. Yet this is impractical from
a performance perspective because it doubles the number of I/Os. As a compromise, we relocate
data pages probabilistically—each time a page is accessed, it has a probably p of being shifted to a
new location within the storage volume. Since longer patterns may contain more information than
shorter patterns and are easier to discover (even if part of it has been relocated), pages in longer
reference patterns should have higher p than those in shorter patterns. For this reason, we intro-
duce the concept of subsequence masking to indicate that a pattern is entirely relocated.
Deﬁnition 2 (Subsequence masking). A subsequence is masked if at most one of its items will
appear the next time the same subsequence is retrieved. For example, a subsequence habci is
masked if only one of {hai, hbi, hci}, or even none of them, appears in the relocated reference
sequence when the same logical pages are requested again.
Suppose the probability of a subsequence with length n being masked is Sr. According to the
deﬁnition, Inequality (2) must be satisﬁed:
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n
1
 
 pðn1Þs  ð1 psÞ þ pns P Sr ð2Þ
where ps is the relocating probability of pages in this n-length subsequence, and thus depends on
Sr and n. Inequality (2) means that, to mask a subsequence with a probability of Sr, pages in this
subsequence should be relocated with a probability of ps. Furthermore, even if a page is not in a
subsequence, a single highly referenced page will also raise suspicion. Hence, on top of sequential-
ity-aware relocation probability ps, we also relocate single page with probability Pr to level the
frequency distribution of individual pages. The ﬁnal relocation probability p is the probability
of ps or Pr, i.e. p = 1  (1  ps) Æ (1  Pr) = ps + Pr  ps Æ Pr. Note that Sr and Pr are tunable
parameters and may be increased to satisfy higher security requirements. Combining with
Inequality (2), we have Inequality 3:
n
p  P r
1 P r
 n1
 ðn 1Þ p  P r
1 P r
 n
P Sr ð3Þ
The ﬁnal relocation probability of a page, namely p, in subsequences with length n is shown in
Fig. 4. One can observe that pages in longer subsequences have higher overall relocation proba-
bility p. The overall relocation probability p depends on the single page relocation probability Pr
and the subsequence masking probability Sr. To illustrate, suppose Pr is 0.2 and Sr is 0.3, 40% of
pages are in subsequences with average length 3 while the remaining 60% are single pages. The
average relocation probability is 0.49 * 40% + 0.2 * 60% = 31.6%. That is, on average, a page
would be accessed 3.165 times before being moved, and the I/Os for writing data pages to their
new locations are expected to add 31.6% overhead to the server load. Note that, for any given
page, the relocation rate may vary each time according to which subsequences it is in.
To relocate a data page, a free page is randomly selected within the storage volume, and
swapped with the data page. The table header and page allocation map are then updated accord-
ingly. Since the header of active tables and the page allocation map are always placed in the cache,
the overhead in updating them will not add signiﬁcantly to the response time. Fig. 5 shows an
example of how page relocation could change the page access patterns between consecutive retri-
evals, on a table occupying pages hP6, P1, P2, P7, P3, P8i. After the table is scanned the ﬁrst time,
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Fig. 4. The relocation probability with various subsequence length.
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P1 and P3 may be relocated, so the page sequence becomes hP6, P9, P2, P7, P0, P8i when the
DBMS scans the table again. After that, the next page sequence could be hP6, P9, P3, P7, P0,
P5i. Hence it is unlikely that an attacker would be able to spot the correlation between the 3 se-
quences from the activity log on the page storage. The above probabilistic page relocation mech-
anism achieves the twin eﬀect of breaking a long database reference into shorter page sequences,
and reducing the number of repetitions for each page sequence. The experiments in the next sec-
tion will show that this lowers very signiﬁcantly the recall of transformed sequences. The down-
side of page relocation is that it is no longer possible to tune system performance through
clustering, as data pages in a table get scattered over time.
The page swapping operation treats page-read and page-write requests diﬀerently. For a page-
write request, the swap operation writes the content of the original page to the new location di-
rectly. In the case of a page-read request, the swap operation reads in the original page, then
writes the content out to its new location. During the swap operation, the following two facts
make sure that it is impractical for the attacker to track locations changes. First, the pages are
re-encrypted before being written back to the storage volume. Each page contains an initial vector
(IV) and a data ﬁeld. The data ﬁeld contains real data in the case of a data page, and random
bytes if it is a free page. For each page, its data ﬁeld is encrypted using a CBC (Cipher Block
Chaining) block cipher with the IV as seed. Whenever a page is re-encrypted, its IV is reset so that
the content of the whole encrypted page changes. For an attacker without the encryption key, it
would be impractical to identify the location changes by comparing the binary content of the
pages. Second, a relocated page may not be written out immediately after the read operation that
causes the relocation. Instead, it is likely to occur several page operations away as the DBMS
rarely sends page requests one by one. For example, from the following sequence: read(P1),
read(P3), write(P2), write(P4), the attacker can only deduce that the page P1 may be relocated
to P2 or P4. As pages get relocated continually, it would be impractical for the attacker to trace
all the possible relocations.
To reduce the performance impact of page relocation, our relocation strategy can also be inte-
grated with the database buﬀering strategy. Speciﬁcally, pages are written back to disk only when
they are evicted from the buﬀer. The beneﬁts of such a delayed write-back strategy are two fold.
First, some of the pages would be dirty when they are written back. Thus, delayed write-back
avoids writing back those pages twice as with an eager write-back strategy (i.e., pages that are read
and immediately written out could be modiﬁed in the buﬀer and hence need to be written back
again). Second, it raises the diﬃculty of tracing location changes because the relocation is delayed
until the page is evicted.
4.2. Out-of-order page prefetching
The method of relocating pages incurs signiﬁcant overhead in I/O throughput. In addition,
they cannot change the sequentiality of the reference sequences the ﬁrst time they are issued.
. ..61 273 8.. . . .. 69 270 8. ..3 0
Relocator
1 9
Fig. 5. Relocating.
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To complement page relocation, knowledge of impending I/Os could be exploited to mix up the
reference patterns before they are issued to the page server. In this section, an out-of-order pre-
fetching technique is introduced to disturb the sequentiality of reference sequences further.
The out-of-order prefetching technique splits a predicted page sequence into several parts, and
randomly prefetches some of them into the database buﬀer beforehand. Later, as parts of this se-
quence are already in the buﬀer, the database buﬀer subsystem would issue only the unbuﬀered
parts of the sequence to the page server. Thus the page sequence appears in the ﬁnal masked ref-
erence sequence as several separate parts instead of as a whole sequence. For example, as shown in
Fig. 6, P5, P6 and P8 are prefetched when the page sequence hP4, P5, P6, P1, P2, P7, P8i is pre-
dicted. The actual issued reference sequence to the page server thus becomes hP4, P1, P2, P7i. At
a later time, when the same page sequence is predicted, P6 and P2 may be prefetched. Hence, it is
unlikely that an attacker would be able to determine that the same page sequence has been re-
quested twice.
The out-of-order prefetching technique eﬀectively splits a page reference pattern into several
parts even if it is issued for the ﬁrst time. It leaves few clues about repeated reference patterns
with negligible impact on I/O performance. However, prefetching is not without restrictions.
Limited by the size of database prefetching buﬀer, it cannot prefetch page requests of a pred-
icated reference page sequence too early, or else the prefetching buﬀer may overﬂow. In addi-
tion, the hint from the query optimizer may not be available very early before the access
sequence is issued. As a result, a powerful mining tool may still observe that the reference se-
quences are clustered. Continuing with the aforementioned example, the attacker may observe
that pages in the set {P1, P2, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8} are often referred near to each other. To
alleviate these problems, it is necessary to combine the prefetching countermeasure with the
relocation strategy.
5. Implementation and evaluation
This section begins by describing a prototype implementation of the proposed countermea-
sures, and then discusses representative results from an experimental study conducted with the
prototype.
5.1. System implementation
To evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the two proposed schemes, we have implemented them in
MySQL [30] as depicted in Fig. 7. The page I/Os of MySQL are passed to a buﬀer module which
returns hit pages immediately. The OOP (out-of-order prefetching) module randomly prefetches
segments of a sequential page sequence into the buﬀer when the page sequence is predicted by the
database engine. All normal and prefetched page requests are then redirected to a page relocation
. . .4561278... . .. 568...4127. ..Buffer
Prefetcher
Fig. 6. Prefetching.
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module, which decides whether to relocate the page or not. The relocation module, which keeps a
map from original page locations to relocated locations, maps pages to their real locations and
forwards the requests to the external page storage which is situated on a remote machine.
When a requested page is received, the page relocation module maps the relocated page back to
its original page. The buﬀer updates its content according to the page, so that the DBMS receives
only legitimate pages. There is thus no need to modify internal mechanisms of the DBMS except
that its query optimizer needs to provide hints to the prefetching and relocation modules when a
sequential reference sequence is predicted. The three components—buﬀer, OOP and SAPR can be
enabled/disabled separately; when the SAPR detects the existence of a buﬀer, it automatically uses
the buﬀer as a write-back buﬀer (see Section 4.1).
5.2. Experiment set-up
To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms, we install the modiﬁed MySQL
DBMS and the page storage server on two Intel PCs. The logical resource and workload are mod-
eled after a TPC-C benchmark [31], and each trial in the experiment consists of 60,000 transac-
tions issued from 10 remote terminals. The database contains 9 base tables, and the workload
is made up of a series of ﬁve diﬀerent types of business transactions—entering new orders, deliver-
ing orders, recording customer payments, monitoring the stock level in a warehouse, and checking
the status of an order. To induce sequential IOs, we introduce queries on unindexed ﬁelds which
lead to full table scans.
Besides the security metrics, recall and entropy measured in the third order (see Section 3.3), I/
O overhead is used to measure the eﬃciency of the schemes. The latter is deﬁned as the total num-
ber of page I/Os from page relocations, divided by the number of data pages requested by the
DBMS. As sequential I/Os are much cheaper than random I/Os, and sequential I/Os are the kind
of I/Os that need to be masked most, the experiments are based on two sequential workloads.
5.3. Experiment with high sequentiality load
The ﬁrst experiment is designed to study the various schemes under high sequentiality load con-
ditions, so there are many queries causing table scans in the system. This represents the worst case
DB Engine (MySql)
Buffer OOP
SAPR Module
Normal + Prefetched
Data Pages
Relocated Page I/Os
Normal + Prefetched
Data Pages
Page Storage
Fig. 7. System implementation.
12
scenario as there are lots of sequential references and hence it is much easier for an attacker to
detect repeated patterns from the page I/O activity log.
Fig. 8a–c plot the entropy, recall and overhead with the SAPR scheme alone. Note that, as
illustrated earlier in Fig. 4, the ﬁnal relocation rate for a single page is the sum of context-free page
relocation rate (Pr) and sequence relocation rate (Sr). To illustrate the eﬀect of sequence relocation
we use four diﬀerent Srs ranging from 0 to 0.3. Fig. 8a shows that when Sr = 0, the entropy in-
creases quickly for Pr smaller than 0.3, and then it rises slowly after that point, while the entropies
with Sr > 0 start with a high value, around 10.2, and grows slowly over time. Note that the upper
bound of entropies depends on how many diﬀerent pages occurred in the transformed sequences.
In Fig. 8b, the recall with Sr = 0 decreases drastically with the increase in page relocation and
reaches 0 when page relocation rate exceeds 0.8; while the recalls with Sr > 0 start low and
approach 0 quickly. The above two results conﬁrm our expectation that the relocation scheme
eﬀectively removes reference patterns contained in the page I/O activity log. Comparing the con-
text-free page relocation and sequentiality-aware relocation method, the latter is more eﬀective in
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Fig. 8. Eﬀect of SAPR without buﬀer: (a) entropy with page relocation rate, (b) recall with page relocation rate and (c)
traﬃc overhead with page relocation rate.
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removing repeated patterns. The overhead result is shown in Fig. 8c. Schemes with Sr > 0 have a
higher overhead than that with Sr = 0 because, in high sequentiality case, the ﬁnal page relocation
is dominated by Sr which is high especially when handling long sequential patterns. Note that the
maximum overhead does not reach 2 when Pr reaches l. The reason is that, unlike the relocation
for page-read requests, relocating a page-write request does not cause two disk I/Os—the page is
just redirected to another location in the page storage volume.
To study the eﬀect of SAPR with a write-back buﬀer and SAPR plus prefetcher, we compare
them with SAPR in Fig. 9a and b. As shown in Fig. 9a, the entropies of SAPR with buﬀer and
SAPR plus prefetcher are on average a little higher than that of SAPR alone, which means the
introduction of buﬀer and prefetcher increases uncertainty in the traﬃc. Fig. 9b shows the traﬃc
overhead is slightly reduced with a buﬀer size that is around 2% of the entire disk pages. We do
not show here the comparison on recall which is near to zero in each scheme.
5.4. Experiment with low sequentiality load
Next, we experiment with low sequentiality loads by mixing only a small fraction of sequential
queries among random queries. The results, given in Figs. 10 and 11, exhibit similar trends as
those in the high sequentiality load scenario. Therefore, we focus only on the diﬀerences next.
In Fig. 10a, the average entropy is a bit higher than that for the high sequentiality workload
as the ratio of random I/Os is much higher here, which leads to higher uncertainty. In addition,
entropies for Sr > 0 increase quickly when Pr goes from 0 to 0.1. A possible reason is that random
IOs may also present a weak correlation which is disrupted when Pr > 0. In Fig. 10c, the overhead
of the SAPR scheme is less than that in the high sequentiality load scenario because the sequential
reference patterns, which lead to high Sr, only occupy a small fraction of the entire reference se-
quence. Fig. 11a and b convince us that the write-back buﬀer and OOP add uncertainty in the
page traﬃc, although they contribute less here as compared to the high sequentiality workload
scenario in the previous experiment.
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Fig. 10. Eﬀect of SAPR without Buﬀer: (a) entropy with page relocation rate, (b) recall with page relocation rate and
(c) traﬃc overhead with page relocation rate.
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5.5. Summary of experiment results
From this series of experiments, we arrive at the following observations:
• Natural page I/Os from concurrent jobs do not disperse the page reference patterns adequately;
the buﬀer alone cannot wipe out all patterns either. Hence a DBMS that supports encryption
needs to implement specially-designed mechanisms to mask its page references.
• The SAPR strategy is very eﬀective in breaking long reference patterns into segments and in
reducing the number of repetitions of the segments, thus preventing an attacker from assem-
bling all the pages of a database object (e.g. a table) in the correct order. A set of recommended
parameters based on our experiment is Sr = 0.1 and Pr = 0.1. Comparing sequentiality-aware
relocation with context-free page relocation, the former targets sequential sequences speciﬁcally
and is thus more cost-eﬀective.
• SAPR with write-back buﬀer increases the diﬃculty in tracing the page location changes; OOP
then further weakens the transformed sequence, making it more random.
6. Conclusion
To support ubiquitous computing, the underlying data have to be persistent and available any-
where-anytime. The data thus have to migrate from devices that are local to individual computers,
to shared storage volumes that are accessible over open network. This exposes the data to height-
ened security risks, because databases exhibit regular page reference patterns that can easily reveal
the logical links among pages. With this knowledge, an attacker can reassemble encrypted data-
base objects and run additional attacks against them, or overwrite relevant pages to compromise
data integrity.
To mitigate the risk of attacks initiated through analyzing the shared storage servers activity
for page patterns, we introduced algorithms that employ data relocation and out-of-order page
prefetching techniques. Experiments showed that data relocation is eﬀective in breaking long ref-
erence patterns and thus reducing the number of times that a pattern is repeated. We also studied
the interplay between data relocation, buﬀering and prefetching, and observed that buﬀering and
prefetching further increase the diﬃculty for the attacker in tracing page relocations and spotting
the reference patterns.
As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst reported work that addresses the threat of jeopardizing en-
crypted data through database page reference patterns. For future work, we intend to extend the
proposed algorithms to various kinds of networked storage systems, such as a P2P storage that
does not have a centralized controller.
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